Fix Succession, Removal and Emergency Powers Before Crisis
GREEN WHITE GO MANIFESTO — 2026.10.01 · CANONICAL THREE-SENTENCE UNIT
If the President dies, resigns, becomes permanently incapacitated or is lawfully removed, the Vice-President serves the remainder of the term; if both offices are vacant, temporary responsibility passes Speaker of the Federal House → Deputy Speaker → Chief Justice → Deputy Chief Justice, with only constrained acting powers, recusal safeguards for any judicial custodian, and a strict constitutional deadline for returning to the ordinary presidential-selection process.
Indirectly selected offices are removed through the institutions that selected them, criminal conduct remains subject to ordinary law regardless of office, and emergency authority may be proposed by the President but granted only with approval from two of three — the Attorney-General, Federal House and Local Legislatures — with the Senate excluded, written advisory opinions required, every declaration time-limited and its legality open to judicial review; detailed procedures belong in the relevant constitutional and emergency-powers legislation and Policy Papers.
These rules are written before a crisis so that no one can fill a constitutional vacuum by improvisation and no emergency can become an alternative constitution.
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Available · v0.2 · 2026-10-01
Download supporting materialsWhy it sits here
These rules are written before a crisis so that no one can fill a constitutional vacuum by improvisation and no emergency can become an alternative constitution.
Evidence and limits
Indirect executive selection and succession arrangements offer component comparisons. They do not prove the complete GWG ticket, confirmation and custodianship design.
The proposal remains distinct from current law and from evidence for individual components.
Evidence notes for this pillarRelated Hard Questions
Because Green White Go gives the Senate a narrow constitutional role and deliberately denies it the broader powers that could turn that role into political guardianship. The Senate publicly interviews eligible civilian President–Vice-President tickets and ranks ten of them. Neither candidate may ever have served in the armed forces. The Senate cannot install a President by itself.
The Federal House must approve a ranked ticket by absolute majority. The same pair must then receive affirmative approval from an absolute majority of all duly constituted Local Legislatures at the applicable certification cutoff. Silence is not consent. If a pair fails either elected gate, the process moves to the next ranked pair.
If all ten fail, the Senate starts again. The Senate has no vote on ordinary federal legislation. It has no emergency-approval vote. So the Senate participates in presidential selection while remaining bounded elsewhere.
The purpose is to prevent any one institution from selecting the President alone.
Because Green White Go does not want the Presidency to carry a separate personal mandate that can be presented as superior to every other institution in the republic. The President is intended to be a constitutional executive, not a national saviour. The office therefore emerges from several institutions that can say no to one another. That comes with trade-offs.
Indirect selection can create bargaining risks, delay and institutional capture. The system therefore has to be transparent, rule-bound and publicly auditable. Indirect selection is not automatically better merely because it is indirect. It is a deliberate attempt to reduce the winner-takes-all character of the Presidency and force national executive power through multiple constitutional gates.
A ticket that fails either elected gate gives way to the next ticket on the Senate’s original ranked list. If all ten fail, the Senate produces a fresh ranked list. This creates a real possibility of delay; the manifesto does not claim that multiple gates eliminate bargaining or capture.
The Presidency & Succession Policy Specification must define the outstanding deadlines and vacancy procedures without removing either elected gate.